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Introduction 
Kate Bronfenbrenner, Sheldon Friedman, Richard W. 
Hurd, Rudolph A. Oswald, and Ronald L. Seeber 
The American labor movement is at a watershed. For the first time since the 
early years of industrial unionism sixty years ago, there is near-universal 
agreement among union leaders that the future of the movement depends 
on massive new organizing. In October 1995, John Sweeney, Richard 
Trumka, and Linda Chavez-Thompson were swept into the top offices of 
the AFL-CIO, following a campaign that promised organizing "at an un-
precedented pace and scale." Since taking office, the new AFL-CIO leader-
ship team has created a separate organizing department and has committed 
$20 million to support coordinated large-scale industry-based organizing 
drives. In addition, in the summer of 1996, the AFL-CIO launched the 
"Union Summer" program, which placed more than a thousand college 
students and young workers in organizing campaigns across the country. 
The events at the AFL-CIO are not happening in a vacuum. Simultane-
ously, some of the nation's other large unions, including the International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT), the Service Employees International Union 
(SEIU), the Communications Workers of America (CWA), the International 
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), and the newly merged Union 
of Needle Trades, Industrial, and Textile Employees (UNITE), have made 
significant structural adjustments at local and national levels to shift re-
sources into organizing. Other unions, such as the Laborers' International 
Union of North America (LIUNA), the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers 
(OCAW), and the United Paperworkers International Union (UPIU), have 
filled voids by establishing national organizing departments, reflecting new-
found commitment to organizing from the top leadership of these unions. 
Many other unions, at both national and local levels, have increased their 
organizing activities significantly. 
This influx of resources and commitment comes at a time when union 
density levels are at their lowest point since the 1930s and many scholars 
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and pundits have been prepared to write off American unions as relics of a 
bygone industrial era, important in their time but no longer relevant for the 
new workplace of the 1990s. Yet recently the familiar litany of union fail-
ures and defeats in the nation's media has also given way to coverage of the 
labor movement's heightened sense of purpose and organizing victories. 
Whether SEIU's organizing gains among thousands of home health aides on 
the West Coast, UNITE's string of victories in manufacturing plants in the 
South, or LIUNA's recent successful campaign with asbestos workers in 
New York City, some unions are winning and winning big, despite employer 
opposition and despite an adverse organizing climate. 
Individually, each of the efforts we have cited would have been striking 
for its aggressiveness even a few years ago. They have yet to translate into 
significant improvements either in union win rates or in the number of 
workers being organized, but, in combination, these developments reflect a 
significant strategic shift in focus on the part of American labor. At the core 
of these union efforts is one overriding goal—to reverse several trends: the 
decline in membership, stagnation in the organizing effort, and steadily 
shrinking bargaining and political power. For today's labor leaders, the 
question is no longer whether they need to make organizing on a massive 
scale the number-one priority but how that can best be achieved. 
Unfortunately, until recently, very little research examined the effective-
ness of union organizing strategies and tactics. With this in mind, the AFL-
CIO and Cornell University's School of Industrial and Labor Relations 
jointly sponsored a conference in April 1996 aimed at generating new re-
search on the conditions contributing to union success in organizing the 
unorganized. The twenty papers in this volume, which were presented at 
that conference, represent a major leap forward in the body of research 
available to those scholars, practitioners, and members of the general public 
who want to develop a better understanding of the organizing strategies 
and issues currently being debated in the labor movement. 
Labor's Challenge 
The recent stirrings in the labor movement come at a time when private-
sector union density levels have reached their lowest point since the early 
1930s. A combination of aggressive organizing, economic expansion, and a 
favorable political, legal, and social climate allowed for unprecedented 
growth in union organizing and power in the United States in the 1930s 
and 1940s, culminating in 1946, when the union share of the workforce 
peaked at 37 percent. Although membership continued to grow in absolute 
terms through the 1970s, unions failed to keep pace with the rapidly ex-
panding workforce. After 1946, the percentage of the labor force belonging 
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to unions dropped slowly but steadily to 21 percent by 1980. Thereafter, 
the decline continued, and membership dipped below 15 percent in 1995 
(U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics [BLS] 1940-80; Bu-
reau of National Affairs [BNA] 1996:D19). 
With only 11 percent of the private-sector labor force now organized, 
the labor movement stands at a critical juncture. More than 300,000 new 
members must be recruited each year merely to keep up with the growth of 
the labor force and compensate for the thousands of union jobs lost each 
year as a result of layoffs and plant closings. Clearly, millions more must be 
organized if the labor movement is ever going to recover the membership 
base it enjoyed in the decade following World War II. 
There has been extensive debate in both the labor and academic commu-
nity over the reasons for the decline in union density.1 Several explanations 
have been highlighted, including the changing economic and political cli-
mate, growing opposition to unions from employers, deficiencies in the law, 
and declining effort on the part of unions. 
Most labor activists and scholars agree that several gradual but dramatic 
shifts in the economy have contributed to the challenges unions face today. 
The rise of global competition, capital flight to low-wage countries and the 
nonunion Sun Belt, and the transition from a manufacturing economy to a 
service economy all are interrelated changes and have resulted in significant 
job loss in unionized industries. These broader economic changes have been 
coupled with equally dramatic technological changes and changes in work 
organization that have resulted in both significant losses of union jobs and 
an increasing reliance on a more flexible and more transitory contingent 
workforce of part-time, temporary, and contract employees. These pressures 
have been reinforced by government economic policies, especially trade 
liberalization and deregulation. 
In spite of the importance of these changes, they offer only a partial 
explanation for the decline in unionization. In their comprehensive article 
reviewing research on factors contributing to union growth and decline, 
Gary N. Chaison and Joseph B. Rose (1991) conclude that although the 
changes in the economic environment have been important, they are respon-
sible for less than one-third of union decline in the United States. 
One thing is clear—the contraction in union density does not stem from 
a lack of interest by America's workers. Many millions of unorganized 
workers desire the benefits of union representation. Recent polls consis-
tently show that more than one-third of all nonunionized workers would 
vote in favor of union representation today if given the chance to do so in 
1. See Chaison and Rose 1991, Lawler 1990, Freeman 1985, Block and Premack 1983, and 
Fiorito and Greer 1982 for summaries of research on union decline. 
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their workplaces. The percentages are even higher for women workers, 
people of color, and younger workers (Lipset 1986; Freeman and Rogers 
1994; Hart Associates and the Mellman Group 1996). 
Polls also show that millions of additional workers would vote for union 
representation were it not for employer opposition. After all, in the public 
sector, where aggressive employer opposition to unionization is extremely 
rare, union win rates and victory margins are well over 85 percent (Bronfen-
brenner and Juravich 1995a). After reviewing evidence on the relationship 
between public attitudes toward unions and density rates, Chaison and 
Rose dismiss claims that "[worker] hostility towards unions may influence 
the ability of unions to recruit new members" (1991:30). They point instead 
to industrial relations policy and employer opposition as the most im-
portant explanations for union decline. 
It is no accident that union density peaked in 1946, the year before 
enactment of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the Wagner Act. The amend-
ments codified into law the decisions of an increasingly conservative Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and federal judiciary, as the national 
political climate shifted from the New Deal toward a more business-friendly 
orientation. Taft-Hartley included strict limits on union organizing and 
mutual aid tactics while granting employers greater latitude in opposing 
unionization. In the postwar years, employers became more aggressive in 
their efforts to contain unionization to already organized industries (Harris 
1982). The labor movement failed to respond effectively to this attack. 
Instead of redoubling their organizing efforts, most unions concentrated 
energy and resources on servicing their current members. 
Although expansion in union density halted after Taft-Hartley, the full 
force of the changes in the legal climate for organizing was not felt immedi-
ately because unions were at their peak of economic power. In the 1970s 
and 1980s, however, with union membership declining absolutely in the 
private sector, employers became more aggressive and union-avoidance 
strategies more sophisticated. In addition, open violations of the laws in-
creased. As Richard Freeman found in his 1985 study of employer behavior 
in union organizing campaigns: "From 1960 to 1980 the number of all 
employer unfair labor practice charges rose fourfold; the number of charges 
involving a firing for union activity rose threefold; and the number of work-
ers awarded back pay or reinstated into their jobs rose fivefold (53)." 
In the 1970s and 1980s, this antiunion offensive spawned an entire indus-
try of management consultants who advised corporate America on how 
best to remain "union free." Employers and their consultants were embold-
ened in their union-busting efforts by a perception that they had support 
from the highest levels of government, especially after Ronald Reagan's 
1981 discharge and replacement of the striking workers in the Professional 
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Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO). Today, aggressive employer 
opposition to unions has become even more pervasive in the private sector. 
Workers who wish to form unions routinely encounter legal delays, intimi-
dation, harassment, and discrimination. A recent study conducted by the 
labor ministries of the United States, Canada, and Mexico found that in the 
period 1992-95, more than one-third of U.S. employers faced with NLRB 
representation elections discharged workers for union activity, more than 
half threatened a full or partial shutdown of the company if the union 
succeeded in organizing the facility, and between 15 and 40 percent made 
illegal changes in wages, benefits, and working conditions, gave bribes or 
special favors to those who opposed the union, or used electronic surveil-
lance of union activists during organizing campaigns (Commission for 
Labor Cooperation 1997).2 
Even when an organizing campaign succeeds, employer opposition con-
tinues. Through a combination of legal and illegal bargaining strategies and 
management practices, including the discharges, threats, and intimidation 
so common in organizing campaigns, employers have succeeded in holding 
down the first contract rate to approximately two-thirds of all certification 
election wins (Cooke 1985; Bronfenbrenner 1994; Pavy and Smith 1996; 
Hurd 1996). In short, employer opposition and weak and poorly enforced 
labor laws have emerged as primary explanations for the decline of unions. 
The right to form and join a union is a fundamental human and civil 
right. Its exercise should not require extraordinary personal heroism or 
subject workers to employer harassment and retribution. As the framers of 
the Wagner Act intended, the decision to form or join a union should be up 
to the workers, not their employers. Major overhaul of U.S. labor law and 
practice would be required to enforce this right. 
At the same time, unions cannot simply look toward deficiencies in the 
law and other external conditions to explain their flagging fortunes. Unions 
themselves bear significant responsibility for the decline in unionization. In 
the decades after World War II, during a period when unions had both 
resources and bargaining power to launch massive organizing efforts, few 
unions organized aggressively. In 1970, unions organized 0.5 percent of 
the private-sector workforce through NLRB elections, compared with 1.5 
percent in 1950. By 1980, this share had fallen to 0.25 and by 1985 to 0.10 
percent (Freeman and Rebick 1989:31). Whole sectors of the economy, 
particularly low-wage service and light manufacturing firms employing 
large numbers of women and people of color, were left nearly untouched by 
union activity. Nor were the growing ranks of professional, technical, and 
2. For a thorough discussion of the range of practices by employers during organizing 
campaigns, see the four chapters in "Part II: Organizing and the Law," in Friedman et al. 1994. 
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white-collar employees, except for those in the public sector, targeted for 
organizing. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, there was a burst of new organizing among 
health-care and clerical workers, dominated by such unions as SEIU, Dis-
trict 65 of the United Automobile Workers (UAW), and Local 1199 of the 
Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union (RWDSU). Coupled with 
the rapid growth in public-sector organizing, these new initiatives brought 
thousands of women and people of color into the labor movement. During 
the last two decades, however, most unions have continued to run fairly 
low-intensity traditional campaigns that relied on gate leafleting, mass mail-
ings, and a few large meetings. Although those tactics may have been 
enough to organize workers in the more friendly organizing climate of the 
1940s, they are clearly inadequate to overcome the ever-more sophisticated 
and more aggressive employer opposition workers routinely face in at-
tempting to organize in the private sector today (Hurd 1997; Rronfenbren-
ner and Juravich 1995c; Bronfenbrenner 1997). 
By the mid-1980s, unions were running fewer and fewer organizing cam-
paigns in smaller and smaller units. At the same time, the nation's largest 
industrial unions had lost hundreds of thousands of members as unionized 
companies shut down, "automated,55 or drastically reduced production. By 
1990, as win rates continued to hover below 50 percent, many unions began 
to recognize that they seriously needed to reevaluate both the resources 
they were committing to organizing and the intensity and quality of their 
organizing campaigns. They understood that they could not wait for a less 
hostile climate but instead needed to focus their efforts on the one element 
of the organizing process that was within their control—their organizing 
strategies and tactics. As the new officers of the AFL-CIO have put it, "The 
most critical challenge facing unions today is organizing. . . . We must first 
organize despite the law if we are ever going to organize with the law55 
(Sweeney, Trumka, and Chavez-Thompson 1995:5). 
Why Organizing Matters 
The outcome of organized labor's revitalization efforts will have influence 
well beyond national union offices and local union halls. The economic 
impact of the decline in union bargaining power has been felt throughout 
the workforce. Although not the only factor, this decline is closely tied to 
the rising economic polarization in American society. As a vast academic 
literature attests, unions raise wages. Unions also reduce wage inequality, 
increase equity (through the principle of "equal pay for equal work55), re-
duce gender- and race-related pay differentials, and tend to reduce age- and 
tenure-related pay differentials (Freeman 1992; Spalter-Roth, Hartmann, 
and Collins 1994). In a nation in which the constitutional right of free 
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speech does not extend to the private-sector workplace, unions are also the 
only true vehicles for workplace democracy and the only means through 
which workers gain an independent voice regarding their daily working 
conditions. 
According to the 1995 Economic Report of the President, a "significant 
portion of the increase in wage inequality during the last fifteen years" is due 
to the decline in unionization (President's Council of Economic Advisors 
1995:182). Falling real wages, growing disparities in wealth, economic inse-
curity, and the erosion of the middle class are all tied in some way to 
the diminished presence of union representation. Even though unions most 
directly benefit those covered by collective bargaining agreements, the spill-
over to nonunion workers from a strong labor movement is substantial. 
As union density declined in the 1970s and 1980s, the influence of the 
union sector on the wages and working conditions of nonunion workers 
diminished. Paradoxically, this decline occurred while productivity was ris-
ing. Since 1979, productivity has increased by 21 percent. Over the same 
period, the average weekly earnings of America's production and nonsuper-
visory workers has fallen by 12 percent after adjusting for inflation (AFL-
CIO Department of Economic Research 1996; President's Council of 
Economic Advisors 1996:330, 332). Without strong unions, workers have 
been unable to capitalize on those gains in productivity and turn them into 
wage and benefit improvements. Meanwhile, without the restraining power 
of unions, corporate leaders have been emboldened to expropriate an ever-
larger share of profits for themselves. Fifty years ago, executives were paid 
forty times the earnings of average workers; today, executives' salaries are 
more than two hundred times those of workers (Jost 1996). Since 1979, 97 
percent of the aggregate increase in income has gone to the richest 20 
percent of households (AFL-CIO Department of Economic Research 1996; 
U.S. Department of Commerce 1995). 
Lower levels of unionization have also led to a loss in political power. 
The labor movement has been able to contribute to the enactment of legisla-
tion that benefits workers generally, such as civil rights laws, wage and hour 
regulations, plant-closing legislation, family and medical leave provisions, 
and occupational safety and health laws. In the last fifty years, however, 
even during periods of relative strength, unions have not been able to press 
successfully for "pro-union" legislation, such as labor law reform or a ban 
on hiring replacements for strikers. Today, with union density at its lowest 
point in over sixty years, even the protective laws are under attack as never 
before. At federal and state levels, conservative legislators are attempting to 
roll back long-standing protections, such as the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act (OSHA), the Davis Bacon Act, state workers' compensation, 
and the National Labor Relation Act's ban on company unions. 
Labor's declining political power became starkly evident when the much-
8 THE EDITORS 
heralded Dunlop Commission, established by President Bill Clinton in 
1993, failed to recommend the kind of substantive labor law reforms neces-
sary to guarantee workers and unions their rights to organize and bargain 
collectively with their employers.3 In the aftermath of the commission's 
recommendations, American labor leaders were faced with the grim reality 
that substantive labor law reform, no matter how badly it was needed or 
how well it was justified, could not be achieved without first significantly 
expanding labor's political power through massive new organizing of unor-
ganized workers. 
Research on Organizing 
Given the prominence of the issue, it is surprising how little is known about 
the strategy, tactics, and process by which groups of workers form and 
join unions. Although there has been considerable macro-level research 
documenting the magnitude of labor's decline, there has been much less 
micro-level research that looks intensively at the organizing process itself, 
particularly the role played by union strategies and tactics. Furthermore, 
much of the academic research suffers because the samples are small, the 
databases are limited, and the researchers lack an understanding of how the 
union organizing process actually works. Most industrial relations research 
on private-sector organizing continues to focus primarily on the election, 
unit, and employer variables easily accessible from NLRB data. From this 
research we have learned much about the influence of environmental fac-
tors, the National Labor Relations Board, and worker attitudes toward 
unions. Despite the great volume of research, however, few studies examine 
the actual process of union organizing campaigns and the importance of 
union characteristics and strategies in determining election outcomes. 
There are several different streams of quantitative research on organizing: 
studies of workers' and the public's attitudes toward unions, individual 
voter decision studies, bargaining unit-level studies, organizational-level 
studies, and time-series research. Complementing the quantitative research 
is a small body of qualitative case study literature. 
The attitudinal research on organizing focuses primarily on the relation-
ship between workers' attitudes toward unions and organizing success. This 
research includes studies that compare differences in attitudes and charac-
teristics between union members and nonmembers and between unorga-
nized workers "with a propensity to organize" and those who do not see 
any benefit in bringing a union into their workplace. Several of these studies, 
such as the 1977 Quality of Employment Survey conducted by the Univer-
3. For a summary of the problems facing the commission, see Friedman et al. 1994. 
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sity of Michigan, have relied on national surveys (Kochan 1979; Farber 
1983; Jarley and Fiorito 1991) or on Gallup and Harris Poll data on work-
ers' changing attitudes toward work and the labor movement (Bok and 
Dunlop 1970; Lipset 1986). This body of research can be helpful in de-
termining which groups of workers have the most positive attitudes toward 
unions and which variables contribute most in determining their attitudes 
toward unions. Since these studies measure attitudes and not actual union 
votes, however, they do not necessarily tell us which workers would be most 
likely to vote for a union in an actual campaign. To date, none of this 
research has examined the role played by union organizing strategies in 
influencing and changing workers' attitudes toward unions. 
Individual voter studies examine the factors affecting individual workers' 
decisions to vote for or against a union in a specific certification election. 
The primary factors analyzed in these studies include job satisfaction, atti-
tudes toward unions, individual characteristics, campaign characteristics, 
and the organizing climate (Getman, Goldberg, and Herman 1976; LeLou-
arn 1980; Schriesheim 1978; Wheeler and McClendon 1991). Although 
these studies better reflect the propensity of workers to organize than do 
surveys of workers' attitudes, they suffer from serious methodological limi-
tations. Particularly problematic is their limited scope and generalizability, 
since most involve small samples of workers employed at a single work site. 
The largest body of quantitative research on organizing includes bar-
gaining unit-level studies of NLRB certification elections (e.g., Cooke 1983; 
Seeber 1983; Lawler 1984; Reed 1989; Maranto and Fiorito 1987; Hurd 
and McElwain 1988). This research tends to focus on the effect that exter-
nal economic and political factors, combined with union and employer 
characteristics and tactics, have on certification election outcomes or the 
percentage of votes for unionization. Most of this research has been based 
on NLRB election tapes, thereby limiting the data to such variables as unit 
size, election type, number of days between petition and election, industry, 
unit, and unfair labor practices. Researchers have supplemented these data 
with employer and organizing climate data collected from other sources for 
variables such as unemployment rates, firm versus industry wage differen-
tials, corporate structure, and regional demographic and political variables. 
The NLRB data have given researchers easy access to comprehensive and 
representative samples. But, in return for the large sample, these studies 
sacrifice important insights into the organizing process because there is no 
way to acquire more than minimal information from the NLRB on bar-
gaining unit demographics, employer tactics, and union characteristics and 
tactics. 
A small number of studies have focused on the variance in organizing 
trends among specific unions, employers, or industries (e.g., Craft and Ex-
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tejt 1983; Reed 1992). Although this research has the potential to provide 
important insights into the relationships among union characteristics, tac-
tics, organizing resources, and organizing success rates, to date these studies 
are few in number and limited in scope. 
The final category of quantitative research includes time-series studies 
that focus on factors contributing to changes in union density, percentage 
union votes, or union election win rates over a specific period of time 
(e.g., Ashenfelter and Pencavel 1969; Bain and Elsheikh 1976; Dickens and 
Leonard 1985; Rose and Chaison 1990). These factors include economic, 
political, and legal variables as well as changes in workforce demographics 
and employer and union structure and tactics. Although time-series research 
may give us a better understanding of the impact of a changing environ-
ment, it provides little concrete information that can aid unions currently 
attempting to revitalize their organizing strategies, since there are no data 
on organizing strategies that would enable us to track changes in strategy 
and tactics over time. 
In combination, the quantitative research on organizing has taught us a 
great deal about the influence of environmental factors, the National Labor 
Relations Board, and workers5 attitudes toward unions. More recently, a 
great many studies have focused on employers' behavior during certification 
elections and on the effectiveness of employer strategies in thwarting union 
organizing efforts. With the exception of recent research by Kate Bronfen-
brenner (1997), Bronfenbrenner and Tom Juravich (1995b), and Richard B. 
Peterson, Thomas Lee, and Barbara Finnegan (1992), most of these studies 
fail to address the critical role played by union strategies in the organizing 
process. 
When union strategies are included in certification election models along 
with organizing climate, bargaining unit demographics, and employer tac-
tics and characteristics, union strategies have been found to play a greater 
role in explaining election outcomes than any other group of variables. As 
recent work by Bronfenbrenner has shown, in a climate of intense and 
pervasive employer opposition, union success in NLRB elections depends 
most on the quality and intensity of union organizing campaigns (1995b, 
1997). 
Although the role of union strategies in the organizing process has been 
largely ignored in the quantitative research, since the mid-1980s a small 
body of qualitative case study research has been developing that closely 
examines union campaigns (e.g., Green and Tilly 1987; Hurd 1989; Fetonte 
and Braden 1990; Lynn and Brister 1989). These studies typically contain 
descriptive analyses of one or more union drives, based primarily on inter-
views with organizers, bargaining unit members, and employers. Supple-
menting these sources are union and management campaign material, 
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NLRB records, BNA reports, and newspaper articles. Unlike other academic 
research, case studies rarely include statistical analysis and are often written 
by labor educators and union staff members rather than by industrial rela-
tions researchers. In fact, many of the authors of these studies are involved 
in the campaigns as participant observers. Because the authors are much 
more likely to have organizing experience or familiarity with organizing 
campaigns, these studies often do a much better job of capturing the reality 
of the organizing process, particularly the complex interaction of employer 
and union characteristics and tactics, than many quantitative studies. 
There are some major weaknesses associated with case study research, 
however. Without random sampling, the cases selected are often unrepre-
sentative of the typical campaign. Many focus on major union victories, 
large and nationally known white-collar bargaining units, which are not 
representative of the majority of union organizing campaigns. Further, by 
focusing on one or two campaigns, the researchers may be unable to deter-
mine how much of what occurred was simply specific to the conditions 
prevailing in those campaigns. Too many of these studies lack critical analy-
sis, neglecting or avoiding the weaknesses of the union campaign. Nonethe-
less, despite these limitations, case studies can play a very important role in 
clarifying the organizing process and in filling in the gaping holes in the 
quantitative research. 
Origins of This Book 
Despite the value of this organizing research, with few exceptions it has not 
contributed in a practical way to union efforts to confront the organizing 
challenge. What is missing from most of the studies is the critical role of 
union strategies and tactics in the organizing process and how those strate-
gies interact with broader environmental factors, bargaining unit demo-
graphics, and employer tactics and characteristics to determine outcomes. 
The editors of this volume believe that the labor movement could clearly 
benefit from sound research that addresses these issues. 
It was in this spirit that the AFL-CIO Department of Economic Research 
and the School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University 
jointly set up the conference that led to the development of the research and 
papers on union organizing that has resulted in this book. In setting up the 
conference, we sought to encourage the presentation of both case studies 
and quantitative research on innovative union organizing strategies across 
all industries and sectors of the economy. In addition, we sought to encour-
age joint union and academic interaction on research projects. Often unions 
have information and data of great interest to academics but have neither 
the time nor interest necessary to analyze the information. Academics have 
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the necessary research tools but often lack access to concrete data and 
information. We sought to bring together these two groups to produce 
research that would provide fresh insights into the current state of union 
organizing in both the public and private sectors and to make that research 
accessible to both trade unionists and academics. 
In our call for conference papers, we also sought to encourage research 
in previously neglected aspects of the union organizing process, particularly 
non-NLRB and community-based campaigns, industry-based studies, and 
both qualitative and quantitative studies that focused on innovative union 
organizing strategies and the relationship between those strategies and em-
ployer behavior, bargaining unit demographics, and workers' and the pub-
lic's attitudes toward unions. We received more than sixty proposals for 
papers for our conference, reflecting the renewed interest and commitment 
to organizing in both the labor and academic communities. 
The conference, which was held from March 31 to April 2,1996, brought 
together more than two hundred trade unionists and academics from a wide 
range of disciplines who support workers' rights to organize and was 
opened by AFL-CIO president John Sweeney, who outlined his administra-
tion's agenda for organizing. Nearly forty papers were presented, all of 
which offered new and original research on factors contributing to union 
success or failure in organizing campaigns. In addition to generating new 
research that greatly expanded our knowledge and understanding of the 
organizing process, the conference provided a rare and valuable opportunity 
for dialogue between union organizers on the front lines and academics 
whose research has been dedicated to the study of organizing. 
Outline of the Volume 
This volume contains a selection of the papers from the Cornell University-
AFL-CIO conference. We have grouped the papers into five parts, reflecting 
common themes. Part I, "Strategic Initiatives in Union Organizing," sets the 
stage for the volume by focusing on broad questions of strategy. Part II, 
"Overcoming Barriers to Worker Support for Unions," offers insight and a 
variety of tactical suggestions on the relationship of the labor movement to 
unorganized workers. Part III, "Community-Based Organizing," presents a 
series of case studies that share the common focus of union organizing 
rooted in a broader community-based strategy. Part IV, "Building Member-
ship and Public Support for Organizing," contains case studies that analyze 
membership involvement and the development of alliances with clergy and 
other community groups. Finally, part V, "Organizing Initiatives by Industry 
and Sector," includes industry-based essays that analyze experiences from 
the coal mining, construction, and steel industries and from the public 
sector. 
INTRODUCTION 
The essays we have included represent a diversity of both qualitative 
and quantitative research methods. In combination, they make a significant 
contribution to filling the void in research on union organizing strategies 
and to addressing some of the methodological weaknesses permeating so 
much of the previous research in this area.4 The quantitative studies are 
representative of four of the major research streams, including studies on 
workers' attitudes toward unions, individual voter studies, bargaining unit-
level election outcome studies, and organizational research. Yet, unlike so 
much of the earlier research, the essays in this volume provide a much richer 
portrait of the organizing process and the critical role played by union 
strategies. The essays by Jack Fiorito and Angela Young and by Dan Corn-
field and his coauthors use population survey data to examine the potential 
role union strategies can play in influencing workers' attitudes toward 
unions before and during organizing campaigns in an atmosphere of anti-
union employer tactics or when combined with community involvement, 
respectively. Similarly, the essays by Larry Cohen and Richard Hurd and by 
Roger D. Weikle, Hoyt N. Wheeler, and John A. McClendon examine the 
effect of employer opposition on workers' propensity to vote for a union 
but, unlike earlier individual voter studies, go on to examine the implica-
tions of their findings for union organizing strategies. The bargaining unit-
level studies, including James Rundle's and the two essays by Kate 
Bronfenbrenner and Tom Juravich, build on Bronfenbrenner's earlier work 
on union strategies by focusing on new areas (Rundle's work on employee 
involvement) and new sectors (Juravich and Bronfenbrenner's public-sector 
study) and by tracking changes in employer and union behavior over time 
(Bronfenbrenner and Juravich). Organizational studies by Immanuel Ness 
and by Fernando Gapasin and Howard Wial lay the groundwork for future 
quantitative research on non-NLRB organizing strategies and the role of 
central labor councils, respectively, in the organizing process. 
The qualitative research included in this volume also makes an important 
contribution by addressing some of the methodological and analytical 
weaknesses so prevalent in earlier case study research. These include the 
seminal essay by Roger Waldinger and his coauthors in which a group of 
scholars from a wide range of social science disciplines provide an in-depth 
critical analysis of the Los Angeles Justice for Janitors campaign; Gregor 
Murray's comparative analysis of the disparate organizing strategies of two 
districts of Steelworkers in Canada; Katherine Sciacchitano's comprehensive 
analysis of the United Electrical Workers' organizing and first contract vic-
4. The papers were chosen based on the quality of the research and analysis and the 
contribution they make to our understanding of successful union organizing strategies. The 
views and recommendations of the authors are not necessarily fully shared by the editors, the 
AFL-CIO, or Cornell University. 
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tory among African American workers at the Steeltech plant in inner-city 
Milwaukee; and Bill Fletcher, Jr., and Richard Hurd's important analytical 
work on the implications of the servicing and organizing models of union-
ism for union organizing success. Going well beyond the somewhat superfi-
cial pieces that constitute so much of case study research, these essays do 
an excellent job of expanding the framework of analysis beyond an individ-
ual union in an individual campaign to address critically the broader social, 
economic, and strategic issues that affect organizing success. 
Other case studies follow a more traditional model by telling the story of 
one or more campaigns, but once again they greatly expand our knowledge 
and understanding of the importance of union strategies by focusing on 
new areas neglected in previous research. Included in this group are essays 
on the role of clergy in organizing, by Ronald Peters and Theresa Merrill; 
on rank-and-file participation in organizing, by Lowell Turner and by Bruce 
Nissen; on community-based organizing, by Ruth Needleman; and on or-
ganizing in specific industries such as coal, by Adrienne M. Birecree, and 
construction, by Janet Lewis and Bill Mirand and by Brian Condit and his 
coauthors. 
Conclusion 
The reemphasis in the labor movement on organizing presents a unique 
opportunity to conduct a critical analysis of which organizing strategies 
are most effective in rapidly and dramatically reversing labor's declining 
membership and power. Until now, there was a paucity of academic research 
that unions could use to aid them in their efforts. By significantly expanding 
this body of research and by encouraging research of a higher standard 
in both method and relevance, this volume provides union leaders with 
information and analysis to aid them in their current organizing efforts and, 
at the same time, lays the foundation for future research. 
This volume is only a beginning, however. As the labor movement rapidly 
expands its organizing efforts and initiatives, there is a great need for con-
tinued research on effective strategies and tactics. It is our hope that this 
book will spawn more extensive research on areas first addressed here, such 
as non-NLRB organizing, industry- and community-based campaigns, and 
the role of central labor councils, community groups, and volunteer orga-
nizers. We also hope that this work generates research in critical aspects of 
organizing that are not addressed here, such as the role of race and gender 
in organizing, strategic targeting, training and recruitment of organizers, 
union commitment of financial resources, and large-scale multiunion cam-
paigns. There is clearly a great deal of work to be done and many critical 
questions that still need to be answered. 
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Will the AFL-CIO and individual unions be able to help large numbers of 
unorganized workers attain union representation without labor law reform? 
Will unions be able to shift the necessary resources to organizing so as to 
overcome a hostile employer community and weak and poorly enforced 
labor laws? Will wider use of the best available organizing tactics and 
strategies help unions surmount their daunting challenges? Will these or-
ganizing initiatives play a significant role in reversing the deteriorating eco-
nomic and social conditions of most American workers? These are among 
the questions that this volume leaves with the reader and the questions that 
face everyone who values and supports a strong and independent labor 
movement. The answers will be significant in shaping the labor movement, 
our system of industrial relations, and the fate of American workers for a 
generation to come. 
